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The article examines the notion of multi-level governance 
(MLG) in the EU as developed by the Committee of the 
Regions in the 2009 White Paper on MLG. It analyses MLG 
from a legal perspective to identify its legal basis. The pa-
per sketches out the nature of MLG as a procedural prin-
ciple in the EU legal system and identifies four functions of 
MLG: shaping the EU as a polity, shaping future develop-
ments in EU law, shaping the behaviour of political actors 
within the EU, and shaping the interpretation of EU law 
by the CJEU. It concludes that MLG as a legal principle 
shall guide the judicial interpretation and application of 
EU law, particularly in relation to the enforcement of the 
principle of subsidiarity, of participation rights of local and 
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regional authorities, and of the locus standi of local and re-
gional authorities in direct challenges to EU acts in Union 
courts.
Keywords: multi-level governance, local self-government, 
regional self-government, EU legal system
1. Introduction
The article1 will examine the notion of multi-level governance (MLG) in 
the EU. This notion, originally created by political scholars to understand 
and explain the functioning and particularly the decision-making process-
es of the EU, has subsequently become a normative and, more recently, a 
legal concept. Whilst the normative notion of MLG has been persuasively 
sketched out by political scholars (Piattoni, 2010; Stephenson, 2013), and 
more recently also by legal scholars (Vandenbruwaene, 2014), MLG as a 
legal notion requires further analysis.
At a very general level, MLG indicates the dispersion of authoritative de-
cision-making across multiple players at different territorial levels within 
the EU (Marks & Hooghe, 2001, p. XI). More specifically, MLG in the 
context of the EU can be used in relation to different phenomena, albeit 
linked to one another. These include the following: 
1. A federalism-like system in the EU or at the national level with vari-
ous tiers of government (European, national, regional, or local): Type 
1 MLG (Marks & Hooghe, 2004, pp. 17-20; Piattoni, 2010, pp. 246-
247)
2. Governance based on special-purpose agencies: Type 2 MLG (Marks 
& Hooghe, 2001, pp. 20-22)
3. Public-private partnerships in the context of the EU Regional Policy 
(Marks, 1992, p. 191; Bache, 2004, p. 165) 
4. Negotiation of policy by private and public players at the national 
and EU level (Schmitter & Kim, 2005, p. 5) 
The Type 1 vision of MLG implies a dispersion of authority to jurisdic-
tions or authorities at a number of territorial levels. These jurisdictions or 
1 This article is a further development of my earlier study The Sub-national Dimension 
of the EU: A Legal Study of Multilevel Governance (Springer, 2015). I would like to thank the 
anonymous referees of this article for their helpful comments.
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authorities – international, national, regional, meso, or local – are “gen-
eral-purpose” in that they bundle together multiple functions, policy re-
sponsibilities, and in many instances, like in the EU, a court system and 
representative institutions (Marks & Hooghe, 2004, pp. 16-20; Hooghe 
& Marks, 2010, pp. 17-20). Hooghe and Marks suggest that in this form 
of governance every citizen is located in a Russian Doll set of nested juris-
dictions, where in principle there is one and only one relevant jurisdiction 
at any particular territorial scale (Marks & Hooghe, 2004, p. 16; Hooghe 
& Marks, 2010, p. 17). These jurisdictions are intended to be, and usu-
ally are, stable over a relatively long period (years or even decades), even 
though the allocation of policy responsibilities across levels might be flex-
ible. The archetype of Type 1 MLG is federalism, which is concerned 
with the allocation and sharing of powers among territorial jurisdictions 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2010, p. 18; Marks & Hooghe, 2004, p. 17). 
Type 2 MLG comprises task-specific jurisdictions (“agencies”) dealing 
with ad hoc issues such as transport, waste and recycling, water quality 
monitoring, and others. In Type 2 MLG there are intersecting member-
ships in that the agencies operate within a territory which is not neatly 
contained within the borders of a larger jurisdiction, and may therefore 
manage issues concerning citizens belonging to different territorial com-
munities and states. The number of agencies is potentially unlimited and 
flexible, as in theory there could be as many agencies as are required by 
the various issues on the agenda, and the agency system could be re-
viewed as appropriate at any point in time (Marks & Hooghe, 2004, pp. 
20-22; Hooghe & Marks, 2010, pp. 20-22).
The EU is the most advanced and complex example of Type 1 MLG be-
yond the national state, even though Hooghe and Marks highlight that 
certain areas of EU governance reflect a Type 2 MLG approach. These 
are, for example, the distinct governance systems or “pillars” for different 
policies, the multiplication of independent European agencies, and en-
hanced cooperation in certain fields such as monetary policy and border 
controls (Hooghe & Marks, 2010, p. 23).
The focus of this study is the participation of regional and local author-
ities in EU decision-making processes (Skoutaris, 2012, p. 212; Panara, 
2016b) in the context of Type 1 MLG. This choice finds justification in 
the prominent role of Type 1 MLG in the context of the EU (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2010, p. 23). It also finds justification in the widely shared sugges-
tion, coming especially from legal scholars, that the EU is a sui generis and 
supranational federation, which features many elements of a traditional 
federation (Schütze, 2012, pp. 77-79, even though he criticises the use 
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of the adjective sui generis in relation to the EU; von Bogdandy 2009, p. 
32). Finally, it finds justification in the prominence ascribed by important 
political documents of the EU, such as the White Paper on European Gov-
ernance (2001) and the White Paper on MLG (2009), to concerns relating 
to Type 1 MLG.
According to a different narrative of MLG proposed by Piattoni (2009 
and 2010, pp. 26-31), there are three different but combined “axes”, i.e., 
three dimensions, of MLG. The first is “centre v. periphery”, which in-
dicates movements away from the unitary state towards decentralised 
systems of governance. The second is “domestic v. international”, which 
indicates movements away from the national state towards increasingly 
structured modes of international cooperation and regulation, including 
the EU. The third is “state v. society”, which portrays movements towards 
the increasing involvement of non-governmental organisations and civil 
society organisations in authoritative decision-making and policy imple-
mentation.
This study, which focuses on sub-national participation in EU processes, 
operates along the axes of “centre v. periphery” (including Type 1 MLG) 
and “domestic v. international” (including the shift of powers from the 
member states to the EU). The objective of this study is to look at MLG 
as a legal notion capable of reconciling these two movements into oppo-
site directions – downwards towards decentralisation (axis 1) and upwards 
towards centralisation at EU level (axis 2) – whilst the third dimension of 
MLG (“state v. society”) is not part of the current analysis.
Following in the steps of earlier works (for example, Weatherill & Bernitz, 
2005; Mangiameli, 2006) and of EU primary law, this study will include 
both “local” and “regional authorities”, i.e., the “sub-national” level of gov-
ernment within the EU. This approach should not be understood as a 
suggestion that there is a homogenous and undifferentiated sub-national 
level of government across the EU (Moore, 2008, p. 524). This meth-
odology is consistent with EU primary law, which does not differentiate 
between the two types of sub-national authorities (the only exception to 
this lack of differentiation is Art. 6(1) of the Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol, 
which envisages consultation with “regional parliaments with legislative 
powers”). 
The distinction between “local” and “regional” authorities is at times am-
biguous at the national level as well. For example, all the French territo-
rial communities share the same fundamental nature, irrespective of their 
level (“regions”, “departments”, or “communes”). In the UK, the concept 
of “local authority” is almost all-embracing in that it includes both small-
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er authorities (such as borough councils) and larger ones, such as com-
bined authorities (e.g., Greater London Authority, Greater Manchester 
and Liverpool City Region). Furthermore, the concept of “region” might 
lead to speculation that a Spanish autonomous community is significantly 
different from a French region or a Belgian community. The only relia-
ble distinction in this field is probably between regions with and without 
legislative powers. However, the legislative powers of regions also vary 
in various member states (cross-state asymmetry) and the constitutional 
standing of these regions varies accordingly. Whenever required by the 
rigour of this study, it will be clarified whether a conclusion applies to all 
sub-national authorities or only to some. Therefore, the approach chosen 
by this study – to include “local and regional authorities” in the analysis 
– will simplify the analysis without sacrificing its methodological rigour. 
So far, the notion of MLG has been primarily employed by legal scholars 
in a descriptive manner, as a tool to illustrate the multi-layered nature of 
the EU, or as a paradigm to understand EU decision-making (for exam-
ple, recently, Popelier et al., 2013; Cygan, 2013 and 2014; previously, 
Bernard, 2002 and Dubos, 2012). Some recent legal studies have explored 
MLG from a legal perspective, and more specifically, have attempted to 
evaluate the impact of MLG on constitutionalism in the EU (Popelier & 
Vandenbruwaene, 2014; Panara, 2015, pp. 155-174), or construe MLG 
as a sui generis system of governance unique to the EU, which is different 
from federalism (Vandenbruwaene, 2014, pp. 235-237; Panara, 2015, pp. 
166-168; contra see Schütze, 2009a, and Stein & Turkewitsch, 2008).
Panara (2015) and Simonato (2016) have investigated the nature of MLG 
as a legal principle. Panara (2015, pp. 73-74) suggests that MLG is a “pro-
cedural principle” in that it commands a “method of governance” based 
on “participation and involvement of sub-national authorities in EU law-
making and policymaking” (ibid. 73). Simonato (2016, pp. 221-223) con-
strues MLG as a principle of coordination of the action of governmental 
actors at various levels within the EU. As a “descriptive principle” with a 
“heuristic function” (Simonato, 2016, p. 222), or as a “procedural princi-
ple” (Panara, 2015, p. 73), the judicial enforcement of MLG is seen by 
these scholars as problematic.
A number of aspects relating to MLG, however, require further study 
from a legal perspective. The legal bases of MLG still need to be persua-
sively identified in EU primary law and in the constitutional laws of the 
MSs. Also, the nature of MLG as a legal principle in the context of the EU 
demands more compelling corroborating evidence, the normative content 
of the principle of MLG needs an accurate definition, and the practical 
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legal consequences of the principle still need to be clearly determined, 
particularly the application of MLG by Union and national judiciaries.
These aspects will be examined from a legal perspective. It is only by means 
of a legal analysis, that is, by interpreting the legal bases of MLG, that it 
is possible to address these questions and particularly to determine the 
legal nature and the legal consequences of MLG in the multi-layered legal 
system of the EU. By the legal system of the EU this paper refers to the 
“constitutional composite” (Verfassungsverbund, Pernice, 2010 and 2009) 
or, according to a different terminology, the “fusion” (Wessels, 1997) and 
the “amalgamation” (Amalgamierung, Nettesheim, 2012, p. 324) resulting 
from the coordination of the EU and the national legal systems.
MLG will be presented as a constitutional principle in the EU legal sys-
tem and the consequences of this conclusion will be illustrated. The article 
is therefore a contribution to a better understanding of MLG in the EU, 
particularly as a legal concept. It aims to highlight dynamics and possible 
developments linked to the legal notion of MLG. The article begins with 
an introduction to the concept of MLG, which distinguishes between de-
scriptive and normative notions of MLG. Then it construes MLG as a 
legal notion, and more specifically, as a legal principle, by identifying the 
legal basis of MLG in EU primary law, in the constitutional laws of the 
MSs, and in EU secondary law. The article goes on to evaluate the role 
of the Union and of domestic courts in enforcing some aspects of MLG, 
including subsidiarity, and analyse the soft law mechanisms reflecting 
MLG. The final paragraph lays out the conclusions.
2.  Sketching Out the Background: The Normative 
Notion of MLG in the White Papers 
Concerns relating to Type 1 MLG are at the forefront of, in particular, the 
White Paper on European Governance of the Commission (2001) and the 
White Paper on MLG of the Committee of the Regions (CoR, 2009). As 
well as a notion describing the “multi-levelness” of the EU, since the 2001 
White Paper MLG has also become a normative notion which goes be-
yond a mere illustration or explanation of the functioning of the EU and 
of the multiple political arenas within the EU. In the 2001 White Paper 
the Commission highlights the importance of communication between 
sub-national authorities and the EU. To this purpose, the White Paper lays 
out recommendations with the fundamental objective of enhancing the 
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legitimacy of EU decisions, but also promoting “good governance” in the 
EU (10-11).
Eight years later, the CoR, in the White Paper on MLG, adopted a notion 
of MLG that is fundamentally “procedural”, as it lays out guidelines in 
relation to how decisions are to be made in the EU. MLG emerges, there-
fore, as a “method” or “approach”: the appropriate method or approach, 
according to the CoR, for bringing together and coordinating the action 
of the different levels of government in the EU multi-level system. More 
specifically, according to the CoR, MLG consists of two key elements: (i) 
the implementation of EU and national law and policy at regional and lo-
cal level (“translating European or national objectives into local or region-
al action”) and (ii) the involvement of local and regional authorities in EU 
law-making and policymaking both at EU and national level (“integrating 
the objectives of local and regional authorities within the strategies of the 
European Union ... and encourage their participation in the coordination 
of European policy”) (6-7). The key objectives of the CoR are to enhance 
the “democratic legitimacy” of Union action and to promote “good gov-
ernance”.
The use of the CoR’s notion of MLG comes from an authoritative, al-
though not legally binding source (a white paper of the CoR), but also 
because it constitutes the basis for recent developments, such as the po-
litical document entitled Charter for MLG in Europe (CoR, Resolution on 
the Charter for MLG in Europe, 106th plenary session, 2 and 3 April 
2014, RESOL-V-012). In addition, this notion has the capacity to capture 
the processes and dynamics of MLG both at the EU level and within the 
domestic sphere. In the light of this notion, MLG can embrace a num-
ber of arrangements such as, in particular: (1) at the domestic level: A) 
procedures for regional and/or local involvement in EU law-making and 
policymaking; B) procedures to ensure compliance with EU obligations 
(e.g., substitute powers of the central government in case of a lack of im-
plementation of EU law by a regional authority); and C) involvement of 
regional parliaments with legislative powers in the early warning system 
(Art. 6(1) Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality). Furthermore, at 
(2) the EU level: A) opening up of the Council to regional representatives 
at the ministerial level (Art. 16(2) TEU); B) involvement of the CoR, 
albeit only in a consultative capacity, in the EU decision-making process; 
C) duty of the Commission to consult widely when making legislative 
proposals and to take account of the regional and/or local dimension of 
the action envisaged (Art. 2 Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionali-
ty); and D) early warning system, which also involves national chambers 
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representing sub-national authorities (Articles 6 and 7 Protocol on Sub-
sidiarity and Proportionality).
The shift from a descriptive to a normative notion of MLG is also high-
lighted in a document of the CoR entitled Scoreboard for monitoring Mul-
tilevel Governance (MLG) at the European level 2011 (December 2011): 
“Against this background, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) wants to 
strengthen MLG in the different strategic priorities of the EU and in the 
different stages of the decision-making process at European level. MLG 
thus acquires a new quality: from analytical tool, it becomes a principle 
and a programme for action. This demands very concretely the estab-
lishment of structured political processes for monitoring and analysing 
governance in the EU.” (p. 2).
The Agenda 2020 of the Commission further emphasises the key norma-
tive role of local and regional authorities in delivering EU policy objec-
tives, but also their contribution to the elaboration of the national reform 
programmes for the implementation of EU strategy (6 and 29). However, 
the positive or negative impact of (Type 1) MLG is still the subject of de-
bate among scholars. Peters and Pierre (2004, p. 87), for example, iden-
tify a “Faustian bargain” in the opaque negotiation of policy taking place 
among players from different levels within the EU. Similarly, DeBardele-
ben and Hurrelmann (2007, p. 240) argue that whilst MLG is likely to in-
crease “output legitimacy” (i.e., the problem-solving capacity of the EU), 
it is also likely to reduce “input legitimacy” (i.e., essentially, democratic 
legitimacy) because of increased difficulties in calling leaders to account. 
Moreover, whilst MLG in the EU may open up new spaces for partici-
pation and deliberation, it may also undermine the equal representation 
of all citizens in the decision-making process. It should be emphasised, 
however, that these scholars construe MLG essentially as negotiation of 
policy by sub-national players at the EU level. Yet, the notion of MLG 
emerging from the CoR’s White Paper goes beyond the mere lobbying ac-
tivity of local and regional offices in Brussels and embraces the “official” 
channels created at MS as well as at EU level (in particular, the CoR).
Other scholars give a more positive evaluation of MLG. Ingolf Pernice 
(2002, p. 11) highlights that constitutionalism in the EU (which he calls 
“multilevel constitutionalism”) requires the participation of local and re-
gional authorities in the EU legislative process in order to compensate 
for the loss of autonomy resulting from the shift of powers to the Euro-
pean level, but also to provide European legislation with the necessary 
experience and knowledge from the ground. The participation he has in 
mind includes preliminary consultation with local and regional authorities 
713






























and emphasises the important role of the CoR. Piattoni (2010, p. 178 et 
seqq.) argues that MLG contributes input and output legitimacy to the 
EU decision-making process and, in particular, that it contributes posi-
tively to democracy in the EU. In the same vein, others suggest that local 
and regional participation in the EU contributes significantly to consti-
tutionalism and particularly to participatory democracy in the EU (Eu-
ropean Parliament, resolution of 14 January 2003 on the role of regional 
and local authorities in European integration, 2002/2141(INI), Point 4; 
Mangiameli, 2006, pp. 460-462, 475-476, 480-481; Greenwood, 2011, p. 
437 et seqq.; Panara, 2016b, p. 622).
3.  The Legal Notion of MLG
3.1.  The Constitutional Foundation of MLG  
at the EU Level 
The first element which is required in order to demonstrate that MLG 
is a legal principle is the identification of a solid legal basis for MLG in 
both EU primary law (i.e., the constitutional charter of the EU) and in 
the constitutional laws of the MSs. Why both? Because MLG envisages a 
multi-level participation in EU decision-making processes, which requires 
suitable arrangements and processes at both the EU and national level. 
Participation in EU decision-making processes is possible only if Euro-
pean institutions open themselves up to such participation and engage 
with it. At the same time, the involvement of sub-national authorities in 
the implementation of EU policies is possible only if MSs recognise the 
prerogatives of these authorities in the fields covered by the EU. This situ-
ation largely reflects the idea, put forward by Ingolf Pernice (2010, p. 102 
et seqq.), that the EU is a “constitutional composite” (Verfassungsverbund) 
resulting from national constitutions and EU primary law.
The constitutional foundation of MLG in the EU can be found in Art. 
4(2) TEU. According to this, the Union shall respect the national iden-
tities of MSs inherent in their fundamental structures, political and con-
stitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. Admittedly, 
it needs to be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis that a certain “con-
stitutional structure” reflects “national identity”, and particularly that a 
certain MLG arrangement reflects that identity and therefore enjoys the 
protection of Art. 4(2) TEU (Cloots, 2015, p. 125 et seqq.). Yet, the 
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constitutional laws of some MSs (for example, Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) strongly corroborate the 
claim that regional and local self-government are an integral part of their 
“constitutional identity”, if not their “national identity”, with the result 
that repeal or limitation of these by force of EU or national law would 
not be legally feasible without a more fundamental change to the state 
constitution (Panara, 2013, pp. 373-376).
But how can local and regional self-government be protected by the EU? 
Given the limited judicial enforceability of Art. 4(2) TEU (infra 3.4.1.), 
the most straightforward way for EU institutions to enhance the role of 
sub-national authorities is by promoting their participation in EU deci-
sion-making processes. This approach is mirrored by the Treaty provisions 
concerning the advisory role of the CoR in the law-making process (Art. 
13(4) TEU; Warleigh, 1999; Ricci, 2011, pp. 110-111), by Art. 16(2) TEU 
concerning the opening up of the Council to regional representatives “at 
ministerial level”, but also by Art. 2 of the Protocol on Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality (duty of the Commission to consult widely before propos-
ing legislation) and Art. 6(1) of the same Protocol on the involvement of 
regional parliaments with legislative powers in the delivery of reasoned 
opinions in the framework of the early warning system. This overview cor-
roborates the conclusion that MLG, as defined by the 2009 White Paper, 
has a constitutional foundation at EU level in EU primary law.
Despite the roots of MLG in EU primary law emphasised above, and 
despite the fact that there is a constitutional framework for regional and 
local participation, the EU cannot oblige MSs to create participation 
channels for sub-national authorities, or to use those prompted by the 
Union. For example, participation in the Council is not only dependent 
on the EU, but especially on if and to what extent each MS allows sub-state 
entities to be involved in the Council. In accordance with the “united in 
diversity” motto, the EU cannot impose uniform patterns on all MSs. The 
EU can open its gates, but it is ultimately up to the MSs and their regions 
and local authorities to seize the opportunity. Therefore, the foundation 
of MLG cannot lie in EU primary law alone. 
Furthermore, the guidance offered by EU primary law is rather minimal. 
Whilst the EU Treaties open up the Union’s processes to forms of sub-na-
tional participation, there is little prescriptive indication on how these 
forms of participation should work in practice. For example, the decision 
on the composition of each (sub-)national delegation to the CoR is large-
ly left up to the MSs. It is up to each MS to strike a balance regarding 
the representation of different levels of governance (regional and/or local) 
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within the CoR. Alone, the opportunities prompted by EU primary law do 
not offer the whole picture of regional and local participation in the EU. 
MLG, far from being a monolithic notion, finding application everywhere 
in the same way, is a largely asymmetrical concept receiving differentiated 
application in each MS. Accordingly, there is no single pathway to MLG, 
but potentially twenty-eight different ones.
The White Paper on MLG stresses that “the conditions for good multilevel 
governance depend on the MSs themselves. The principles and mecha-
nisms of consultation, coordination, cooperation and evaluation recom-
mended at Community level must firstly be applied within the Member 
States.” (ibid. 7). The reflection paper emanating from the Co-Creation 
Workshop of 16 April 2012 concerning the European Charter on MLG 
put forward a number of recommendations to the MSs. These include: 
“stimulate regionalisation and decentralisation”, “strengthen further the 
cooperation between national parliament and regional parliaments, nota-
bly on subsidiarity scrutiny”, “facilitate the participation of RLA [regional 
and local authorities] into all stages of the EU policy cycle”, and “further 
develop participation of RLA into the national delegation to the Council 
formal/informal meetings and comitology” (ibid. 4).
3.2.  The Constitutional Foundation of MLG  
at the National Level 
At the national level, the foundation of MLG lies in the national consti-
tutions of the MSs. All these constitutions protect regional and/or local 
autonomy, and in a number of MSs local/regional autonomy is an element 
of national identity as defined in Art. 4(2) TEU (Cloots, 2015, p. 226). 
This suggestion is reinforced by the fact that all the EU MSs are also par-
ties to the European Charter of Local Self-Government promoted by the 
Council of Europe in 1985. This convention stipulates that the principle 
of local self-government shall be recognised, where practicable, in the na-
tional constitution (Art. 2). Therefore, one of the key challenges for the 
MSs is to ensure a sustainable balance between decentralisation to the 
sub-national authorities and supranational integration, i.e., centralisation 
at the EU level. The MSs have developed strategies to reconcile local/
regional autonomy with the growing role of the EU (Panara & De Beck-
er, 2011; Popelier, 2014). These strategies are reflected in legal (often 
constitutional) arrangements and perfectly mirror the approach typical of 
MLG: promoting multi-level participation.
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A strategy to reconcile local/regional autonomy with the EU is the involve-
ment of regional and local authorities in the decision to transfer powers to 
the EU. The traditional and orthodox EU law perspective is that the MSs 
are the sole “masters of the Treaties”. A reading of Art. 48 TEU on the 
procedures for amending the Treaties appears to confirm this. However, 
the transfer of powers from the national level to the EU could undermine 
the role of local and regional authorities and alter the constitutional bal-
ance of powers between central and sub-national governments. This com-
plexity of the EU multi-level system is addressed by certain MSs (in par-
ticular Belgium, Finland, Germany, and Austria) through the involvement 
of sub-national authorities in decisions concerning the European Treaties. 
For example, Belgian regions and communities have an important say in 
the transfer of their exclusive powers to the EU. A treaty concerning these 
powers is ratified by Belgium only if the parliaments of all the regions and 
communities concerned consent to it. As a result, every sub-state parlia-
ment has a right to veto Belgium’s ratification of the treaty (De Becker, 
2011, p. 256). In Germany, the Länder are involved collectively, as a level of 
government, in the approval of a treaty. An individual Land does not have 
right of veto. Every new treaty would need to be approved by a two-third 
majority in the Bundesrat (the legislative chamber representing the Länder 
at the federal level), as well as in the Bundestag (the democratically elect-
ed chamber representing the German people; Art. 23(1) Basic Law). The 
German system is similar to the solution adopted in Austria, where amend-
ments to the Treaties require a two-third majority both in the Nationalrat 
(the chamber representing all the Austrian people) and in the Bundesrat 
(the chamber representing the Länder at the federal level; Art. 50(1) No. 2 
and 50(4) Federal Constitutional Law; Eberhard, 2011, p. 219).
In addition to their ex post involvement in the ratification of a new treaty, 
MSs may also involve sub-national authorities in the work of an intergov-
ernmental conference (IGC), leading to a new treaty. The German Länder 
had two representatives in the German delegation to the IGC, which led 
to the Maastricht Treaty. Their participation contributed to securing the 
introduction of the principle of subsidiarity, the establishment of the 
CoR, and the opening up of the Council to regional ministers (Gunlicks, 
2003, pp. 366-67). This form of involvement is very important, because 
the opportunity to negotiate a new treaty could be more effective than the 
ex post approval (or threat of non-approval) of a treaty already negotiated 
and agreed on by the national governments.
Another strategy adopted by MSs is the involvement of regional and lo-
cal authorities in the implementation of EU secondary and tertiary law 
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and policy, and in decision-making processes linked to the EU. This is 
envisaged in the White Paper on MLG of 2009. A number of MSs have a 
framework in place for the involvement of their sub-national authorities 
in the choice of the position of the MS in EU decision-making fora (espe-
cially the Council) in relation to those policy issues touching upon sub-na-
tional responsibilities and interests (see Panara & De Becker, 2011, p. 
297 et seqq.; Eggermont, 2011). This participation can take the form of 
an agreement between national government and sub-national authorities 
concerning the position of the MS in the Council (Belgium, Spain); of a 
consultation of sub-national authorities by the national government (Ita-
ly, Portugal, UK); or of more complex decision-making procedures taking 
place in the Bundesrat, the chamber representing the Länder (Austria and 
Germany; see, respectively, Eberhard, 2011; Panara, 2011).
This participation enables sub-national authorities to maintain and pos-
sibly expand their constitutional role of protecting sub-national interests, 
while being involved in supranational integration in the EU (Panara, 
2010, pp. 82-83). It is apparent that local and regional participation in 
EU decision-making processes has a constitutional mission. It is constitu-
tionally required by the MSs (at least by those whose constitutional sys-
tems include regional and/or local self-government) and, to the extent 
to which quasi-federal arrangements in the domestic sphere reflect the 
“national identity” of a MS, also by EU primary law (supra 3.1.). This is 
an example of how the EU and the national legal orders adjust to each 
other in the context of the European legal system, in conformity with the 
doctrine of European public law put forward by Birkinshaw (2014, p. 6 
et seqq.), and to the idea, typical of constitutional pluralism, that the EU 
and the national legal orders have to take into account their respective 
constitutional requirements as much as possible (cf. in particular Poiares 
Maduro, 2012).
3.3.  EU Secondary Law
As well as being rooted in EU primary law as a notion embracing po-
tentially all areas of action by the Union, MLG is also reflected in EU 
secondary law concerning specifically energy policy, as well as economic, 
social, and territorial cohesion. Regulation (EU) No. 1233/2010 on EU 
financial assistance to projects in the field of energy contains a significant 
reference to MLG. Point 3 of the Preamble establishes that MLG, defined 
as “cooperation among the various tiers of government”, is essential to the 
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development of further renewable energy sources and the promotion of 
energy efficiency. Regulation No. 1233 also creates a dedicated financial 
facility in support of investment projects related to energy efficiency and 
renewable energy by local, regional, and national public authorities (Point 
4 of the Preamble and Annex II). The notion of MLG as “cooperation” 
incorporates the idea of coordinated action by various levels of governance 
for the achievement of European objectives, but also the idea that both 
the EU and the MSs shall respect the role of sub-national authorities in 
relation to these objectives. For example, Regulation No. 1233 establishes 
that the financial support of the Union shall facilitate investments in en-
ergy saving, energy efficiency, and renewable energy projects from local, 
regional, and, “in duly justified cases”, also national public authorities (An-
nex II). Regulation No. 1233 focuses, therefore, on the first dimension of 
MLG linked to translating European objectives into local and/or regional 
action. By means of financial intervention, the EU wishes to enhance the 
role of regional and/or local authorities in relation to energy.
The strongest reference to MLG can be found in Regulation (EU) No. 
1303/2013 on EU funding promoting economic, social, and territorial 
cohesion. This act expressly indicates MLG as a “principle” that, along 
with subsidiarity and proportionality, must be “respected” by MSs when 
creating partnerships with sub-national authorities and other economic 
and social actors for the implementation of the EU economic, social, and 
territorial cohesion policy. Like in the CoR’s White Paper on MLG, in Reg-
ulation No. 1303 MLG also emerges as a “procedural” concept, that is, as 
a method of governance which envisages the involvement of sub-national 
authorities (“In accordance with the multi-level governance approach, the 
partners ... shall be involved by the MSs in the preparation of Partner-
ship Agreements and progress reports and throughout the preparation 
and implementation of programmes”, emphasis added, cf. Art. 5(2)) and 
requires “coordinated action” between the different levels of governance 
(“In order to respect [the] principles [of partnership and MLG] coordi-
nated action is required, in particular between different levels of govern-
ance”, Point 5.1 (1), Annex I).
Regulation No. 1303/2013 also contains indications concerning the raison 
d’ètre of MLG, where it says that respect for the principles of partnership 
and MLG is required “in order to facilitate achieving social, economic 
and territorial cohesion and delivery of the Union’s priorities of smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth” (Point 5.1 (1), Annex I). Accordingly, 
in the view of the EU legislator, partnership with sub-national authorities 
finds its justification in the need to enhance the effectiveness of EU social 
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and cohesion policy. Similarly, Regulation No. 1303 also stresses that the 
ultimate purpose of a partnership in the context of EU regional policy is 
“to ensure the ownership of planned interventions by stakeholders and 
build on the experience and the know-how of relevant actors” (Point 11 of 
the Preamble). The phrase “ownership by stakeholders” suggests that the 
participation of sub-national authorities in EU regional policy could con-
tribute to the acceptance of these policies, i.e., to their legitimacy (“own-
ership”), as well as to their effectiveness.
The inclusion of MLG as a key principle of EU regional policy sets aside 
any remaining doubts concerning the nature of MLG as a legal concept. 
MLG clearly emerges as a principle of procedural nature (i.e., a principle 
that requires a certain “method” or “approach”), which must be respect-
ed by MSs in the field of economic, social, and territorial cohesion. In 
the context of this policy, MLG is a “principle” (Preamble to Regulation 
1303/2013) established by Union law and, as such, its interpretation could 
theoretically be referred to the Court of Justice via preliminary references 
arising in domestic courts. Yet, the Court of Justice is likely to adhere to 
a minimal and procedural notion of MLG. The EU can require that MSs 
respect a certain “method” or an “approach” when implementing Europe-
an policies; however, it cannot impose a specific multi-level structure on 
them. The “method” of MLG commands an appropriate involvement of 
sub-national authorities and of other relevant players in the preparation 
and execution of projects in EU economic, social, and cohesion policy. 
Far from laying out a set of prescriptive rules, in this policy area MLG 
emerges as a principle, and more specifically, as a “procedural principle”, 
indicating in general how decisions shall be made and implemented. The 
added value of this method is an increased legitimacy and effectiveness of 
EU regional policy.
3.4.  The Role of the Courts
The Court of Justice of the EU. The justiciability of a principle is not essential 
in order to conclude that that principle is a legal and not a philosophical 
or political notion. For example, the justiciability of the principle of sub-
sidiarity is very limited and controversial, and yet that principle remains 
a constitutional cornerstone of the EU (Van Nuffel, 2011, p. 78; Panara, 
2016a, p. 305 et seqq.). Similarly, judicial enforcement of various aspects 
of MLG does not need to be the primary route for ensuring compliance at 
the EU and national level (Winter & May, 2001, p. 675 et seqq.). Still, the 
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traditional, widely accepted notion of constitutionalism as a “legal limita-
tion on government” (McIlwain, 1947, p. 21; see also along the same lines 
Morbidelli 2010, p. 66; de Vergottini, 2007, p. 177 et seqq.) highlights 
that a legal limitation on power does not only require an adequate system 
of political rights and freedoms and of checks and balances in the political 
process. It also requires an important role of the judiciary in enforcing the 
legal limits to the exercise of political powers, particularly by means of 
constitutional adjudication (Matteucci, 2010 [1964], p. 91; Nolte, 2005, 
pp. 16-18). This and the following section will show how both Union and 
domestic courts have a role to play in enforcing and shaping MLG. There 
are fundamentally three ways in which the judiciary of the Union can play 
a role: (1) in relation to the Treaty articles embodying the idea of MLG, 
(2) in relation to the concept of “national identity” of Art. 4(2) TEU, and 
(3) in relation to acts of secondary law which contain reference to and 
embody the concept of MLG. 
(1) In relation to those norms of EU primary law which embody or reflect 
MLG, Union courts can play the ordinary role they would play in relation 
to any other primary law rule. For example, lack of consultation of the 
CoR when this is compulsory could lead to the annulment of the relevant 
act by the CJ. The CoR itself could request the annulment via direct ac-
tion pursuant to Art. 263(3) TFEU. Admittedly, though, it is difficult to 
imagine a possible role for the CJ in relation to regional participation in 
the Council (Art. 16(2) TEU) and to the involvement of regional parlia-
ments with legislative powers in the delivery of reasoned opinions in the 
framework of the early warning system (Art. 6(2) Subsidiarity Protocol).
The legal position is potentially different in relation to the duty of the 
Commission to consult widely before drafting a legislative proposal (Art. 
2 Subsidiarity Protocol). This is an important channel for political coop-
eration and dialogue, which may help the Commission and law-making 
institutions to focus on the potential impact of a regulation. It is unlike-
ly that the CJ would uphold the claim that a certain act is unlawful for 
lack of, or inadequate, preliminary consultation. However, the Union 
judiciary has already expressly recognised that consultation contributes 
legitimacy to the EU law-making process. In the case of UEAPME, the 
Court of First Instance (hereafter CFI) held that whenever the European 
Parliament does not participate in the enactment of a legislative act, the 
principle of democracy requires an alternative form of participation by 
the people. If such participation takes the form of social dialogue, the 
Commission and the Council have an obligation to verify that the social 
partners involved are sufficiently representative. Only in this way can the 
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democratic legitimacy of the EU law-making process be preserved (Case 
T-135/96, UEAPME v. Council [1998] ECR II-2335 para. 88–89; Smis-
mans, 2004, p. 340 et seqq.; Popelier, 2011, p. 567; White Paper on Eu-
ropean Governance, 2001, p. 11).
(2) Article 4(2) TEU appears likely to lend itself to judicial enforcement 
in relation to MLG only in extreme circumstances. Probably, like for sub-
sidiarity (Panara, 2016a, p. 321; contra Schütze, 2009b and Vandenbru-
waene, 2012 and 2013, who argue in favour of stricter judicial scrutiny 
of subsidiarity), only a clear instance of abuse, such as an EU regulation 
on economic, social, and cohesion policy completely ignoring the role of 
sub-national authorities, would find Union courts willing to annul it for a 
breach of Art. 4(2) TEU. An analysis of the jurisprudence of Union courts 
on Art. 4(2) TEU in relation to regional and local autonomy offers impor-
tant insights regarding MLG.
As previously stated, the implementation of EU law and policy by sub-na-
tional authorities is a constitutive element of MLG as defined in the 
2009 White Paper of the CoR (supra 2). This aspect came to the fore in a 
few cases concerning or surrounding Art. 4(2) TEU: Commission v. Spain 
(2013) and Digibet (2014).
An interesting statement going in this direction can be found in the Opin-
ion that Advocate General Kokott delivered in the case of Commission 
v. Spain, concerning a failure by the Spanish autonomous communities 
to implement Directive 2000/60/EC on the water policy of the EU. In 
response to the argument advanced by Spain, that a national regulation 
transposing the directive had already ensured full compliance with EU 
rules, Kokott noted that this method of transposition (i.e. the subsidiary 
application of national rules) is probably in breach of Spanish constitu-
tional law, because it does not acknowledge the legislative responsibility 
associated with the legislative power of the regional authorities. Through 
this argumentum ad adiuvandum AG Kokott implicitly recognised that the 
responsibility of the autonomous communities for the implementation of 
EU law in the areas falling within their legislative remit is an essential part 
of the constitutional identity of the Spanish state (Opinion of AG Kokott 
30 May 2013, Case C-151/12, Commission v. Spain, para. 34-35).
More recently, the CJ had an opportunity to clarify that “the division of 
competences between the [German] Länder cannot be called into ques-
tion, because it benefits from the protection conferred by Article 4(2) 
TEU” (Case C-156/13, 12 June 2014, Digibet Ltd and Gert Albers v. West-
deutsche Lotterie GmbH & Co. OHG, para. 34). Also, the Court reiterat-
ed the principle, already sketched out in earlier case law (Joined Cases 
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51-54/71, 15 December 1971, International Fruit Company NV and oth-
ers v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit), that the EU cannot alter the 
allocation of responsibilities within MSs (Case C-156/13, Digibet, para. 
33). The Opinion of AG Mengozzi in the case of RegioPost, reflected in 
the judgment of the Court in the same case, says in express terms that 
“it is clear from Art. 4(2) TEU that EU law cannot prevent a regional or 
local entity from actually exercising the powers vested in it within the MS 
concerned.” (para. 84 of the Opinion). Accordingly, the Land of Rhine-
land-Palatinate is entitled to pass legislation requiring the tenderers of a 
public procurement contract and their subcontractors to pay a minimum 
hourly wage to staff involved in the execution of the contract (Opinion of 
AG Mengozzi 9 September 2015, Case C-115/14, RegioPost GmbH & Co. 
KG v. Stadt Landau; Case C-115/14, 17 November 2015, RegioPost GmbH 
& Co. KG v. Stadt Landau).
At the same time, the Court has always consistently maintained that the 
internal allocation of competences within a MS (between central, region-
al, or local authorities) cannot in any way release that MS from fulfilling 
its obligations under EU law (CJEU 8 September 2010, Case C-46/08, 
Carmen Media Group Ltd v. Land Schleswig-Holstein, Innenminister des 
Landes Schleswig-Holstein, para. 69; 13 September 2001, Case C-417/99, 
Commission v. Spain, para. 37; 28 February 1991, Case C-131/88, Com-
mission v. Germany, para. 71; 14 January 1988, Joined Cases 227-230/85, 
Commission v. Belgium, para. 9).
Admittedly, however, the expansive force of Art. 4(2) TEU in relation to 
the role of sub-national authorities seems to be limited (contra, it would 
appear, Cloots, 2015, p. 226 et seqq.). The General Court dismissed the 
argument that the lack of recognition of locus standi of Northern Ireland 
goes against the obligation of the EU (stemming from Art. 4(2) TEU) to 
respect the national identity of the UK, including its regional self-govern-
ment. According to the Court “such an obligation does not in any way 
impinge on the Treaty provisions on judicial remedies” (Case T-453/10, 
6 March 2012, Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural De-
velopment v. Commission, para. 36-38, the quote is from para. 38). This 
statement reflects the consolidated position of Union courts on the lack 
of privileged applicant status of the sub-national authorities in direct 
challenges under Art. 263 TFEU (see, ex multis, ECJ 11 July 1984, Case 
222/83, Municipality of Differdange v. Commission, para. 8; 21 March 1997, 
Case C-95/97, Région Wallonne v. Commission, para. 6-7; 1 October 1997, 
Case C-180/97, Regione Toscana v. Commission, para. 7-8; 30 April 1998, 
Case T-214/95, Vlaams Gewest v. Commission, para. 28; see also Gamper, 
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2013, pp. 118-120; Thies, 2011, p. 25; Dani, 2004). This judicial position 
leaves a gap in the judicial protection of the rights of sub-national author-
ities in the EU. This gap is not overcome by the judicial remedies available 
pursuant to Articles 267 and 277 TFEU (Panara & De Becker, 2011, p. 
324). More effective ways of filling this gap have been developed at the 
domestic level by the creation of tools enabling sub-national authorities, 
individually (like in Belgium) or collectively (like in Italy and Germany), 
to oblige the national government to file an action for direct annulment 
before Union courts pursuant to Art. 263 TFEU (Panara & De Becker, 
2011, p. 326).
(3) The CJEU could be asked to correctly interpret the concept of MLG 
through a preliminary reference, when this concept is used in EU sec-
ondary law. To date, only Regulation (EU) No. 1233/2010 on renewable 
energy sources and Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 on EU economic, 
social, and cohesion policy refer expressly to MLG.
In summary, the legal nature of MLG is confirmed by the current and 
potential role of the Court of Justice of the EU in relation to the en-
forcement of certain aspects of the notion of MLG: the participation in 
EU decision-making processes, the implementation of EU law and policy, 
and, finally, the interpretation of the notion of MLG put forward by EU 
secondary law.
Domestic courts. Domestic courts, especially constitutional courts, can 
play a role in the enforcement of some aspects of MLG at the national 
level. More specifically, they can play a role by: (1) sanctioning a failure to 
comply with participatory arrangements established by national law, (2) 
preserving the right and duty of local and regional authorities to imple-
ment EU law and policy, and, finally, (3) contributing to the definition of 
important concepts such as “national identity”, “fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional”, and “regional and local self-government” 
(Art. 4(2) TEU).
(1) If participatory arrangements established by domestic law are not ob-
served, the sub-national authorities in some MSs are theoretically enti-
tled to instigate judicial proceedings in domestic courts to enforce their 
participation rights. This might be the case in Italy and Spain, where the 
rights of sub-state authorities could be enforced in constitutional or ad-
ministrative courts (Panara & De Becker, 2011, pp. 315-317) and, with 
greater difficulty, in Austria (Panara & De Becker, 2011, pp. 316-317). 
This might also be the case in Germany. The constitutional participatory 
rights of the German Länder through the Bundesrat are in principle en-
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forceable in the Federal Constitutional Court (see Art. 93(1), No. 1 and 
No. 3, Basic Law). However, in 1995 the Court found that the Federal 
Government had not respected the rights of the Bundesrat in relation to 
Directive 89/522/EEC on TV. The Court held that this behaviour was in 
breach of the principle of federal loyalty (Ruling of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court of 22 March, 1995). Nevertheless, this declaration did not 
result, nor could it, in the invalidity of the directive. Admittedly, the im-
possibility of declaring the invalidity of the final act could undermine the 
effectiveness of the judicial intervention. This example suggests that, in 
case of non-compliance with participatory arrangements, the sanction for 
a national government might be political (and might concern the legitima-
cy of an action), rather than legal (and lead to the invalidity of an action).
The primary problem with the enforcement of participation rights of re-
gional authorities is therefore the following: should a national court find 
that a domestic law provision has not been complied with, that court 
would still not be entitled to declare the invalidity (or the inapplicability) 
of the EU measure. According to the “orthodox” EU perspective, the in-
validity of EU legislation can be declared only by Union courts. Another 
problem is that it could take some time before a domestic court passed 
a ruling on the judicial enforcement of regional participation rights. This 
would not necessarily be compatible with the speed of EU decision-mak-
ing processes. This situation surely limits the effectiveness of national 
provisions regulating the participation rights of sub-state entities. This 
explains why regional authorities generally prefer to settle their disputes 
with the national government politically, in conformity with the principle 
of loyal cooperation, rather than judicially (Panara & De Becker, 2011, 
p. 318).
(2) Sub-national authorities have a primary responsibility for the imple-
mentation of EU law and policy in those areas falling within their remit. 
This principle is explicitly (UK, Section 53 and Paragraph 7(2) of Sched-
ule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998, Paragraph 3(c) Schedule 2 of the North-
ern Ireland Act 1998, Section 80 of the Government of Wales Act 2006; 
Italy, Art. 117(5) of the Constitution) or implicitly (Germany, Belgium, 
Spain) entrenched in the constitutional systems of the MSs (Panara & 
De Becker, 2011, pp. 333-335). Constitutional courts can definitely play 
a role in ensuring that the implementation of EU law and policy follows 
the internal allocation of responsibilities between national and sub-na-
tional authorities. Even in the UK, where certain arrangements concern-
ing devolution and MLG are “binding in honour only”, in the event of a 
disagreement between the UK government and devolved administrations 
725






























over whether a particular issue falls within a devolved competence or is 
retained by Westminster, the dispute might be referred to the Supreme 
Court (Paragraph B4.9 of the Concordat on the Co-ordination of EU 
Policy of September 2012).
The rule that the implementation of EU law and policy shall follow the 
internal distribution of responsibilities admits only limited and justifia-
ble exceptions, although the boundaries of these exceptions are uncertain 
and vary from state to state. The Italian Constitutional Court (Ruling No. 
126 of 24 April 1996) stated that an alteration of the normal distribution 
of competences between the state and regions may exceptionally be ac-
cepted if the proper implementation of an EU regulation required the 
adoption of uniform rules across the entire national territory. In the Rul-
ing of 14 October, 2008 concerning EC Regulation No. 1782/2003, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) held that 
the proper implementation of the Regulation required a federal statute 
in order to safeguard the legal and economic unity of the country (para. 
88-89). 
The Austrian Constitutional Court created the interesting notion of dop-
pelte Bindung (double bond). The domestic legislator is indeed “bound 
twice”. On the one hand, it has to comply with EU obligations, and on the 
other hand with the national constitution, including the distribution of re-
sponsibilities between Federation (Bund) and Länder. The Länder have the 
constitutional right and, at the same time, the duty, to implement EU law 
and policy within their sphere of responsibility and territory. If in a matter 
within the remit of the Länder an EU act required uniform implementa-
tion within the national territory, it would be necessary to amend the con-
stitution (Austrian Constitutional Court 14.863/1997 and 17.022/2003). 
However, if, pursuant to Art. 258 TFEU, the Court of Justice found that 
an Austrian Land failed to comply with an obligation under EU law, the 
responsibility to adopt the necessary measures would pass temporarily to 
the Federation (“substitute power”, Art. 23d, paragraph 5, final sentence, 
B-VG; Eberhard, 2011, pp. 229-230).
Substitute state powers as a tool for the implementation of EU law and 
policy are also in place in other MSs such as Italy, Spain, and Belgium 
(Panara & De Becker, 2011, pp. 336-340). The constitutional distribu-
tion of powers between central government and regional level could be 
seriously undermined if substitute powers were exercisable a priori, i.e., 
before the non-fulfilment of an EU obligation and in order to prevent it 
from occurring. The Spanish Constitutional Court envisaged that a sub-
stitute power can be exercised only after the non-fulfilment of an EU ob-
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ligation by a region has taken place (Spanish Constitutional Court Ruling 
No. 80 of 8 March 1993). Such a clear stance, however, has not been 
taken by constitutional courts in other MSs, such as Italy, where a priori 
substitution is the rule, even though regional authorities can replace the 
implementing measures issued by the central government with their own 
(Villamena, 2011, p. 175). 
(3) The concept of “national identity” (and those of “fundamental struc-
tures, political and constitutional” and “regional and local self-govern-
ment” of Art. 4(2) TEU) is a notion of EU law and as such its content 
shall be further specified by the CJEU. However, the specific content of 
“national identity” is also likely to result from the way each MS under-
stands its own identity. Accordingly, the CJEU might also have to rely on 
national law and particularly on the case law of the constitutional courts 
(von Bogdandy & Schill 2010, p. 8; Streinz, 2012, p. 28; see also the 
Ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the ratification of 
Treaty of Lisbon of 30 June 2009). 
In summary, again, the legal nature of MLG is confirmed by the role of 
domestic courts, in particular in relation to: (1) ensuring that national 
authorities comply with participatory arrangements established by nation-
al law and linked to MLG, even though in practice the effectiveness of 
these remedies is limited; (2) protecting the right (and duty) of local and 
regional authorities to implement EU law and policy within their remit, 
although this right of regional authorities has occasionally been restricted 
by the courts (for example, in Italy and in Germany) and through the 
creation of state substitute powers; and, finally, (3) in relation to the po-
tential contribution of domestic courts to the specification of the content 
of Art. 4(2) TEU from a national perspective.
3.5.  MLG and Subsidiarity
Another issue closely related to MLG is subsidiarity. Pursuant to Art. 
5(3) TEU, “the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the MSs, either at 
central level or at regional and local level”. According to some scholars, 
subsidiarity is a political or philosophical concept and, as such, its judicial 
enforcement is impossible or extremely difficult (Working Group I 2002, 
p. 2; Barber, 2005a; Toth, 1994, p. 282). The Court of Justice of the EU 
seems to perceive this principle as a “threat to integration” (Estella, 2002, 
p. 178), as “totally alien” to the EU (Toth, 1992, p. 1079), and in conflict 
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with the “broad ethos” of the Court (Barber, 2005b, p. 199). The constitu-
tional relevance of this problem is high, because it is linked to the general 
problem of constitutionalism as a legal limitation to political power (McIl-
wain, 1958 [1947], p. 21), which in turn presupposes a judicial review of 
the actions of public authorities (Matteucci, 2010 [1964], p. 91; Barberis, 
2012, pp. 20-21).
Van Nuffel (2011, pp. 65-66) criticises the opinion depicting the Court 
of Justice as “consistently unwilling to review Community legislation for 
alleged violations of subsidiarity” (Cooper, 2006, p. 284). Even though it 
is a hard fact that there has been no single case before the Court of Justice 
that has resulted in the annulment of an act for breach of subsidiarity, 
analyses of the cases concerning subsidiarity highlight that the Court does 
not uphold EU action without appropriate scrutiny (Van Nuffel, 2011, 
pp. 65-66; Craig, 2012, p. 80; Panara, 2016a, p. 319; contra Vandenbru-
waene, 2013, p. 159). According to these analyses, the circumstance that 
until now no act of the Union has been annulled for a breach of that prin-
ciple is essentially due to the limited number of cases in which subsidiarity 
pleas have been brought before the Court (Craig, 2012, p. 80) and to the 
fact that in all cases there were persuasive justifications for the action of 
the Union (Van Nuffel, 2011, pp. 65-66; see, inter alia, Case C-84/94, UK 
v. Council [1996] ECR I-5755; Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. European 
Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079; Case C-491/01, The Queen v. 
Secretary of State for Health (ex parte British American Tobacco Ltd.) [2002] 
ECR I-11453; Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, ANH v. Secretary of 
State for Health [2002] ECR I-6451; Case C-103/01, Commission v. Ger-
many [2003] ECR I-5369; Case C-58/08, The Queen v. Secretary of State for 
Business (ex parte Vodafone) [2010] ECR I-4999; Case C-508/13, Estonia 
v. European Parliament and Council, EU:C:2015:403; Case T-257/13, Po-
land v. Commission, EU:T:2015:111; Case C-358/14, Poland v. European 
Parliament and Council, EU:C:2016:323).
In no circumstances did the Court come to a conclusion in relation to 
subsidiarity which was different from that advised by the Advocate Gen-
eral (AG). Whilst, admittedly, the opinions of some Advocates General 
entail a surface scrutiny of subsidiarity (see, for example, AG Geelhoed’s 
Opinion in Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 ANH v. Secretary of State 
for Health), others have been quite thorough when tackling the same issue 
(AG Poiares Maduro, Opinion in Case C-58/08, The Queen v. Secretary 
of State for Business (ex parte Vodafone); AG Jääskinen, Opinion in Case 
C-507/13, UK v. European Parliament and Council [para. 101 et seqq.]; 
AG Kokott, Opinion in Case C-358/14, Poland v. European Parliament 
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and Council; AG Léger Opinion in Case C-84/94, UK v. Council [Work-
ing Time Directive]).
It is difficult to picture how the Court of Justice could give more sub-
stance to the rights of regional and local authorities through subsidiarity. 
None of the cases on subsidiarity have ever concerned regions or local au-
thorities within the MSs directly, and the protection of regional and local 
authorities in Art. 5(3) TEU has so far remained on paper (Van Nuffel, 
2011, p. 61). MLG envisages participation by sub-national authorities in 
EU decision-making processes (cf. 2 supra and CoR White Paper MLG, 
2009). Therefore, whilst subsidiarity is judicially enforceable in extreme 
circumstances of clear abuses, MLG pushes towards multi-level coopera-
tion or procedural mechanisms alternative to judicial enforcement in or-
der to ensure compliance with subsidiarity (Panara, 2015, pp. 121-122).
The most important procedural innovation introduced by the Lisbon Sub-
sidiarity Protocol is certainly the “early warning system” (Articles 6 and 7), 
a mechanism aiming to create a dialogue between national parliaments 
and Union institutions during the legislative process. Whilst it is not easy 
to reach the minimum number of votes for triggering a “yellow” or an 
“orange card” (so far only two yellow cards have been issued), the early 
warning system is potentially important for regional participation in EU 
decision-making processes in that national parliaments shall consult with 
regional parliaments with legislative powers (Art. 6(1)). In theory, the ear-
ly warning system could also modify the traditional self-restraint of the 
Court of Justice in relation to subsidiarity. The evidence contained in the 
reasoned opinions of national parliaments and of the Commission could 
be taken into account by the Court of Justice when addressing a subsidi-
arity complaint. Additionally, the procedural requirements of the early 
warning system seem to be judicially enforceable and failure to comply 
with these could lead to the invalidation of an act by the Court. In this 
way, however, the Court would be enforcing certain procedural require-
ments rather than subsidiarity per se (Panara, 2016a, pp. 327-328).
A similar tendency towards “proceduralisation” can be seen in the role of 
the CoR in relation to subsidiarity. When performing its consultative role, 
the CoR will normally express its point of view on the conformity of a leg-
islative proposal with subsidiarity (Art. 55(2) CoR’s Rules of Procedure; 
Ricci, 2011, pp. 123-126). The Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol gave the CoR 
the right to challenge a legislative act on grounds of infringement of sub-
sidiarity (Art. 8(2)). Despite that, the CoR does not appear particularly 
confident that subsidiarity can be enforced through judicial review. So far 
no challenge has been lodged by the CoR against an act for infringement 
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of subsidiarity. Admittedly, it cannot be ruled out that the right to chal-
lenge, albeit not yet exercised, may have strengthened the opinions of the 
CoR vis-à-vis law-making institutions. For this reason, the CoR may be 
playing a stronger role in the legislative process, in which case compliance 
with subsidiarity would stem from multi-level dialogue and cooperation 
between political actors rather than from judicial scrutiny.
The procedural requirement for the Commission to consult the CoR (al-
beit not only in relation to subsidiarity) regarding proposals in certain 
policy areas is judicially enforceable. Pursuant to Art. 263(3) TFEU the 
CoR has the status of a privileged applicant when challenging an act to 
protect its constitutional prerogatives. Like in the early warning system, 
however, there would be a shift of focus of the judicial review from sub-
sidiarity per se to the enforcement of certain procedural requirements 
linked to subsidiarity. This is why Nettesheim (2014) labels subsidiarity 
as politisches Recht (political law), an oxymoronic notion indicating those 
legal provisions which are only or principally enforceable through forms 
of political coordination.
3.6.  Soft Law Mechanisms
Alongside the hard law mechanisms illustrated previously (supra 3.1., 
3.2. and 3.3.), there are soft law instruments at EU level which promote 
multi-level participation of sub-national authorities in the EU. A tool 
prompted by the Commission in the wake of the 2001 White Paper is the 
structured dialogue created by the Commission’s communication (Com-
munication from the Commission COM (2003) 811 final of 19 Decem-
ber, 2003) and by a decision of the CoR (CoR’s Bureau Decision CoR 
380/2003, part II, of 19 March, 2004). The structured dialogue consists 
of meetings between representatives of the Commission and selected Eu-
ropean and national associations of sub-national authorities. These asso-
ciations are identified by the Commission, upon advice from the CoR. 
The meetings of the structured dialogue may concern the annual work 
programme of the Commission (“general dialogue”) or a particular policy 
area (“thematic dialogue”; in the literature cf. Vara Arribas, 2005, p. 19 et 
seqq.; Domenichelli, 2007, p. 71 et seqq.; Ricci, 2011, p. 122).
In 2006 the European Commission launched a political dialogue with 
national parliaments (Communication to the European Council, A Citi-
zens” Agenda, Brussels, 10 May 2006, COM (2006) 211 final, p. 9). Due 
to the flexible nature of political dialogue compared to, for example, the 
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early warning system (political dialogue is not limited to subsidiarity in 
relation to legislative acts, nor is it bound by rigid deadlines), national 
parliaments or chambers thereof (including those houses representing re-
gional authorities such as, in particular, the German Bundesrat), use this 
tool more frequently than the early warning system. In 2014, 506 opinions 
were issued by national parliaments, but only 21 of those were reasoned 
opinions issued in the context of the early warning system (Commission 
2014: Annex 1). In 2015, 350 parliament opinions were issued, but only 
6 of those in the context of the early warning system (Commission 2015: 
Annex 1). 
4.  Conclusion
The preceding legal analysis of MLG suggests that MLG, as defined in 
the White Paper of 2009, is a legal as well as a normative notion. The na-
ture, scope, and sphere of application of MLG go significantly beyond 
the traditional descriptive notion of MLG of the early days (Marks, 1992; 
Hooghe & Marks, 2001). MLG has a constitutional foundation both at 
the EU and at national level. The fundamental idea of MLG is rooted 
in legal arrangements both at the EU and at national level, as well as in 
hard and soft law mechanisms. MLG envisages participatory solutions 
to constitutional problems linked to the position of local and regional 
authorities in EU integration.
MLG is normatively linked to the principles of local and regional autono-
my and of subsidiarity. It operationalises these in the multi-level context 
of the EU by envisaging participation by local and regional authorities in 
EU decision-making processes and in the implementation of EU law and 
policy. MLG has the characteristics of a legal concept and, more specif-
ically, of a legal principle. It is sufficiently “general” and “fundamental” 
to be a principle, but at the same time it is sufficiently prescriptive to 
indicate a way forward in terms of the future direction and development 
of the EU. It can be classified as a “procedural” principle, which focuses 
on how decision-making processes shall be structured within the EU and 
on who has to participate in these processes. It can also be described as an 
“accessory” principle in that it is functional to the normative values embod-
ied in local and regional autonomy and in subsidiarity (Panara, 2016a, pp. 
305-306).
This study has identified four functions of MLG as a legal notion in the EU.
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1. Epistemological function concerning the nature of the EU. Quite right-
ly, Marks and Hooghe argue that federalism is the intellectual foun-
dation of Type 1 MLG (Marks & Hooghe, 2004, p. 17). The EU, 
like federal or regional states, is a multi-level system (Benz, 2009). 
These systems feature a plurality of mutually interacting layers of 
governance and, despite significant differences, belong to the same 
fundamental family, the “federations” (Schütze, 2012, pp. 77-79). 
The legal notion of MLG adds to this background a constitutional 
traction towards multi-level cooperation in relation to the shaping 
and implementation of EU laws and policies. It envisages a strong 
cooperative philosophy for the EU, which is remindful of cooperative 
federalism, based on participation by sub-national authorities in the 
decision-making processes of a central authority, as opposed to the 
rigid separation of spheres of responsibility typical of dual federalism 
(on “dual” and “cooperative federalism” cf. Reposo, 2005; Bognetti, 
1994; de Vergottini, 1990).
2. De iure condendo function. As a bi-dimensional (both national and 
EU) constitutional principle, MLG pushes towards a certain devel-
opment of the EU as a multi-level system. It is a principle remindful 
of the “programmatic rules” of some national constitutions (Crisaful-
li, 1952). These rules lay out objectives for the legislator in various 
areas, from economy to education or healthcare. MLG is similar to 
these “rules” in that it lays out a “plan of action” concerning how the 
EU and its MSs have to structure the relationship between layers of 
governance within the EU. As previously stated, the mutual conver-
gence of the EU and its MSs towards MLG reflects the idea, typi-
cal of constitutional pluralism, that the EU and national legal orders 
shall take into account their respective constitutional requirements 
as much as possible (Poiares Maduro, 2012). A Treaty amendment 
that would go in the fundamental direction of MLG would be, for 
example, an extension of the eight-week period for the release of a 
reasoned opinion. This would enhance regional participation in the 
early warning system and promote compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity.
3. Behaviour-shaping function. Because it is normatively linked to local/
regional autonomy and subsidiarity, MLG as a procedural principle 
on how to make decisions in the EU shall guide the behaviour of 
actors in the EU political arena. The Commission, for example, shall 
consult “widely” before proposing legislation (Art. 2 Subsidiarity Pro-
tocol) and the consultation shall include local and regional actors. 
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Where appropriate, the proposed legislation shall create participation 
mechanisms for these actors (see, for example, the “partnerships” 
with local and regional authorities envisaged by EU Regulation No. 
1303/2013). 
 Compliance with subsidiarity in particular can be enhanced through 
mechanisms of multi-level cooperation and dialogue, such as struc-
tured and especially political dialogue, and lead to legislation more 
respectful of the autonomy of sub-national authorities and MSs. On 
the other end of the spectrum, as well as the EU and the MSs, local 
and regional actors shall also actively engage with the EU and utilise 
the participation opportunities prompted by the EU.
4. Interpretation-shaping function. MLG as a legal principle shall also 
guide the interpretation and application of the law by the courts and 
particularly the Court of Justice of the EU in relation to: subsidiarity, 
enforcement of the participation rights of local and regional author-
ities, and the locus standi of local and regional authorities in direct 
challenges to EU acts in Union courts. In relation to subsidiarity, the 
application of MLG should lead not only or necessarily to stricter ju-
dicial scrutiny of Art. 5(3) TEU. Rather, it should ensure compliance 
with subsidiarity ex ante, during the law-making process, through 
multi-level dialogue and cooperation (for example, through consulta-
tion of the CoR or the early warning system) and the enforcement of 
these procedural requirements by the Court of Justice.
 As to the participation rights of sub-state authorities, the “orthodox” 
EU law position – in principle – of indifference to decision-making 
processes internal to the MSs would lead the Court of Justice to ignore 
any infringements of these rights by the MSs. This position reflects a 
residual “regional blindness” of the EU, i.e., its traditional tendency 
(until the 1990s) to completely ignore sub-national authorities (on the 
concept of “regional blindness”, Landesblindheit, see Ipsen, 1966). This 
disadvantage for the regions could be addressed by the Court of Jus-
tice, if it chose to consider unlawful EU acts for a breach of national 
rules concerning regional participation. A judicial enforcement of the 
participation rights of the regions could find its legal basis, apart from 
in the principle of MLG, in the protection of “national identity” pursu-
ant to Art. 4(2) TEU, or in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties (Art. 46). However, it would need to be demonstrated in each 
case that an infringement of regional participation amounts to a viola-
tion of “national identity” or to a manifest violation of a rule of internal 
law of fundamental importance respectively.
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 Finally, MLG could mitigate the consolidated position of the Court 
of Justice on the locus standi of local and regional authorities and 
establish an interpretation of Art. 263(3) TFEU which would make 
it easier for local and regional authorities to challenge the validity of 
acts which have a detrimental impact on their responsibilities and 
interests (AG Jacobs, Opinion in Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores v. Council, para. 102, although not specifically in relation 
to sub-national authorities).
In summary, the legal analysis identifies a compelling legal basis for MLG. 
This in turn becomes a more stable concept with a constitutional founda-
tion, and less exposed to political dispute. The legal analysis also identifies 
the potential of MLG for the interpretation of EU law and for shaping 
future developments within the EU legal system. 
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MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Summary
This is a legal study of multi-level governance (MLG) in the EU. Earlier legal 
studies investigated the nature of MLG as a legal principle, suggesting that 
MLG is a “procedural principle” or a “principle of coordination” of the action 
of governmental and non-governmental actors at various levels within the EU. 
However, the legal bases of MLG still need to be persuasively identified in EU 
primary law and in the constitutional laws of the member states, the nature of 
MLG as a legal principle in the context of the EU requires more compelling 
evidence, the normative content of MLG needs a more accurate definition, and 
the practical legal consequences of MLG still need to be clearly determined, es-
pecially the application of MLG by Union and national judiciaries. This study 
looks at these aspects from a legal perspective. It argues that MLG envisages 
participatory solutions to constitutional problems linked to the position of local 
and regional authorities in the EU. MLG is normatively linked to the princi-
ples of local and regional autonomy and of subsidiarity. It operationalises these 
principles in the multi-level context of the EU by envisaging the participation of 
local and regional authorities in EU decision-making processes and in the im-
plementation of EU law and policy. This study identifies four functions of MLG 
as a constitutional principle in the EU legal system: (1) the epistemological 
function concerning the nature of the EU, (2) the de iure condendo function, 
(3) the behaviour-shaping function, and (4) the interpretation-shaping function. 
MLG as a legal principle shall also guide the interpretation and application of 
the law by the courts, and particularly the Court of Justice of the EU, in relation 
to the enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity, the enforcement of participa-
tion rights of local and regional authorities, and the locus standi of local and 
regional authorities in direct challenges to EU acts in Union courts. 
Keywords: multi-level governance, local self-government, regional self-govern-
ment, EU legal system
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VIŠERAZINSKO UPRAVLJANJE KAO USTAVNO NAČELO U 
PRAVNOM SUSTAVU EUROPSKE UNIJE 
Sažetak
Rad se bavi temom višerazinskog upravljanja u Europskoj uniji s pravnog as-
pekta. Prijašnja istraživanja bavila su se višerazinskim upravljanjem kao prav-
nim načelom navodeći na zaključak da je riječ o proceduralnom načelu ili na-
čelu koordinacije poteza koje povlače sudionici vladinog i nevladinog sektora 
na različitim razinama unutar EU-a. Ipak, primarno zakonodavstvo EU-a i 
ustavna zakonodavstva država članica tek trebaju uvjerljivo prepoznati pravne 
temelje višerazinskog upravljanja. Ono kao pravno načelo u kontekstu EU-a 
zahtijeva uvjerljivije dokaze, njegov normativni sadržaj valja preciznije defini-
rati, a i jasno odrediti konkretne pravne posljedice, posebice njegovu primjenu 
u sudstvu EU-a i nacionalnim sudstvima država članica. Ovaj se rad bavi tim 
pitanjima s pravnog gledišta te zastupa stav da višerazinsko upravljanje pred-
viđa participativna rješenja za ustavne probleme vezane uz položaj lokalnih 
i regionalnih vlasti u EU. Ono je normativno povezano s načelom lokalne i 
regionalne autonomije i načelom supsidijarnosti te se u višerazinskom kontekstu 
EU-a operacionalizira predviđanjem sudjelovanja lokalnih i regionalnih vlasti 
u procesima odlučivanja na razini EU-a, kao i u primjeni zakona i politika 
EU-a. Rad izdvaja četiri funkcije višerazinskog upravljanja kao ustavnoga na-
čela u pravnom sustavu EU-a. To su: (1) epistemološka funkcija koja se bavi 
prirodom EU-a, (2) funkcija de iure condendo, (3) funkcija oblikovanja po-
stupanja, i (4) funkcija oblikovanja tumačenja. Kao pravno načelo ono će tako-
đer usmjeravati sudove, posebice Europski sud pravde pri tumačenju i primjeni 
zakona koji se odnose na provođenje načela supsidijarnosti i prava na sudjelo-
vanje lokalnih i regionalnih vlasti, kao i na locus standi lokalnih i regionalnih 
vlasti u izravnom sukobu sa zakonima EU-a u postupcima koji se vode pred 
sudovima EU-a. 
Ključne riječi: višerazinsko upravljanje, lokalna samouprava, regionalna sa-
mouprava, pravni sustav EU-a 
